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Farber: Uncertainty as a Basis for Standing

UNCERTAINTY AS A BASIS FOR STANDING
DanielA. Farber*
To obtain standing, a plaintiff must show that he has suffered an
"injury in fact." That injury must be concrete and particularized, as well
as being actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.1 I will
argue that, paradoxically, under some circumstances the fact that an
injury is extremely uncertain ought to satisfy this test.
Courts have a tendency to draw a stark line between present harms
and future risks. But in the modem economy, this line is necessarily
blurry. Insurance companies exist to handle risks. Risks can also be
managed through futures markets and self-insurance. All of these
mechanisms translate potential future events into present-day economic
transactions. It would be silly to say that a rise in insurance rates or the
unavailability of insurance did not constitute injuries in fact. The
response of markets to risk can provide a valuable filter, distinguishing
between the merely speculative prospect and the immediately costly
uncertainty.
We can begin to see why this may be so by considering a classic
standing case, where the Court reached the right result for the wrong
reason. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
of the
Inc.,2 the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality
Price-Anderson Act,3 which limits the liability of the nuclear industry
for damages resulting from a single nuclear accident. The plaintiffs
claimed that without this limitation on liability, reactors would not be
built, which would be to their benefit because a proposed Duke Power
reactor would damage a lake they used. Their claim on the merits,
however, did not relate to these immediate environmental injuries.
Instead, it related to the liability limitation if and when a reactor in their
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1. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81

(2000).
2.

438 U.S. 59 (1978).
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vicinity became involved in a nuclear accident. The plaintiffs contended
that if they were injured and their damages exceeded the amount allowed
by the statute, the statute would constitute an unconstitutional taking of
property without compensation.
The Court did not find standing on the basis of this possible future
harm, probably because of the argument that the harm was too
speculative. Instead, the Court relied on another standing claim. The
plaintiffs claimed that they were suffering immediate environmental
injury as a result of a statute which might be unconstitutional if it were
ever applied to them in the future. The reason was that without the
statute, the companies involved might have been unable to get financing
or insurance. Despite the tenuousness of the chain of causation, the
Court held that there was a "substantial likelihood" that the nuclear
plants near the plaintiffs' homes would not be completed or operated
without the financial security blanket provided by the statute.4 This was
held to be a sufficient basis for standing. The defendants had also
attacked the plaintiffs' standing because the injury which they were
using to establish their standing had no logical relationship to their
claims on the merits. The Court held, however, that such a nexus
between the plaintiffs' injury and the claim on the merits was
unnecessary. 5
Not everyone has been convinced, then or later. For example,
Justice Stewart said:
The claim under federal law is to be found in the allegation that the
Act, if enforced, will deprive the appellees of certain property rights, in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. One of
those property rights, and perhaps the sole cognizable one, is a
state-created right to recover full compensation for tort injuries. The
Act impinges on that right by limiting recovery in major accidents.
But there never has been such an accident, and it is sheer speculation
that one will ever occur. For this reason I think there is no present
justiciable controversy, and that the appellees were without standing to
initiate this litigation.
Similarly, Justice Stevens said:
The string of contingencies that supposedly holds this litigation
together is too delicate for me. We are told that but for the
4. 438 U.S. at 81 n.26.
5. Id. at 78-79.
6. Id. at 94-95 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Price-Anderson Act there would be no financing of nuclear power
plants, no development of those plants by private parties, and hence no
present injury to persons such as appellees; we are then asked to
remedy an alleged due process violation that may possibly occur at
some uncertain time in the future, and may possibly injure the
appellees in a way that has no significant connection with any present
injury. It is remarkable that such a series of speculations is considered
this litigation ripe for decision or to establish
sufficient either to make
7
appellees' standing.
Scholars have been equally skeptical and have tended to view the
case as an example of the manipulation of standing doctrine to obtain a
desired outcome. 8
The evidence before the Court was that the chance of an accident
was very small--one in twenty thousand for a serious accident, and one
in a billion for a catastrophic one.9 It is not surprising that the Court was
reluctant to view such low-probability events, with the added
contingency of the plaintiffs being unable to recover full damages
because of the statute, as constituting injury in fact. As Justice Stewart
said, whether such an event would ever occur seemed entirely
speculative and shrouded in uncertainty. Or, as the majority opinion put
it, "the likelihood of an accident occurring which would result in claims
exceeding the sum of the financial protection required and the
governmental indemnity is exceedingly remote, albeit theoretically
possible." 10
And yet, uncertainty may have very real and immediate economic
costs. The evidence in Duke Power was that, unless the uncertainty
about liability limits for catastrophic accidents could be resolved, the
industry would be unable to survive. For example, when the statute was
in danger of expiring, a House committee reported that "[r]eactor
manufacturers and architect-engineers are already requiring escape
7. Id. at 102-03 (Stevens, J., concurring).
8.

See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 82 (3d ed. 1999).

9. The Court noted:
The Reactor Safety Study published by the NRC in 1975 suggested that there was a I in
20,000 chance (per reactor year) of an accident causing property damage approaching
$100 million and having only minor health effects. By contrast, when the odds were
reduced to the range of 1 in 1 billion (per reactor year), the level of damages approached
$14 billion; and 3,300 early fatalities and 45,000 early illnesses were predicted.
438 U.S. at 84 n.28. I should note that these estimates may have been unreliable. In any event, the
use of "reactor years" in the estimates may give a misleading impression-if there were a thousand
reactors in operation, even by this estimate there would be a 1 in 10,000 risk of a truly catastrophic
accident each century.
10. Id. at 85-86 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 89-883, at 6-7 (1965)).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1123

clauses in their contracts to permit cancellation in the event some form
of protection from unlimited potential liability is not provided. Action is
required soon to prevent disruption in utility plans for nuclear power."'"
Sometimes an uncertainty is just an uncertainty (to paraphrase
Freud's reported remark about the symbolic significance of cigars), but
sometimes an uncertainty about the future is the economic equivalent of
a tangible injury today. How are courts to tell the difference? As Duke
Power indicates, the size of the odds is not always a reliable indicator.
But as Duke Power also indicates, markets may provide a better
indicator of how "real" a risk should be considered.
Risk, after all, is something that businesses must address on a daily
basis, and there is an entire industry (insurance) dedicated to translating
future risks into present costs. When the market takes a risk seriously,
there is every reason for courts to do the same. (The converse may not
be true-risk markets do not necessarily cover every risk that might be
significant.) The markets obviously thought that uncertainty about future
liability had immediate relevance to the industry. That ought to be good
enough to satisfy a court that the risk was tangible enough to constitute
an injury in fact.
From this perspective, Duke Power can be decided without
resorting to the convoluted reasoning of the majority. On the merits, the
plaintiffs' claim was based on uncertainty about the future, namely the
prospect that if an accident occurred they would receive limited
compensation. We know that this uncertainty was considered important
enough to motivate hard-headed business executives to make major
investment decisions. Thus, a decision striking down the statute would
certainly inflict an injury in fact on the industry. The risk to the plaintiffs
(having their liability limited) is simply the mirror image of the risk to
the industry (having full liability). The markets have ruled the risk to be
a significant present concern, which was enough to establish standing.
Thus, we can explain Duke Power in a straightforward way.
Uncertainty is a particularly pervasive problem in environmental
law. Chris Stone cogently described the high level of scientific
uncertainty about environmental problems, noting that we "are only
beginning to learn how the world works," and that our ignorance extends
to global climate, habitat and biodiversity. 2 Stone made a particular
effort to investigate the state of scientific knowledge regarding global

11.

Id. at 76 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-648, at 7 (1975)).

12. CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN: GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND
HUMAN AGENDA 24 (1993).
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climate change.' 3 What he and his research assistant found was that
we fished, the vaguer and more
"[t]he deeper into the better authorities
14
landed."'
we
projections
the
qualified
Stone's observations remain generally valid today. Consider the
two topics he mentioned: biodiversity and climate change. We are still
unsure of the number of species in peril. For example, although the
"most commonly cited figure for the fraction of the global flora
threatened with extinction" is thirteen percent, another recent estimate is
that "as many as half of the world's plant species may qualify as
threatened with extinction.' 15 Similarly, despite much scientific
progress, predictions regarding global climate change are still shrouded
in uncertainty.' 6 Because of this uncertainty, the International Panel on
Climate Change ("IPCC") consciously decided not to include probability
estimates in its Third Assessment Report ("TAR"):
It was the unanimous view of the TAR lead authors that no method of
assigning probabilities to a 100-year-climate forecast is sufficiently
widely accepted and documented in the refereed literature to pass the
extensive IPCC review process. Three reasons stand out: the difficulty
of assigning reliable probabilities to socioeconomic trends (and hence
emissions) in the latter half of the 21st century, the difficulty of
obtaining consensus ranges for quantities like climate sensitivity, and
the possibility of a nonlinear response in the carbon cycle or ocean
circulation to17 very high late-2 1st-century greenhouse gas
concentrations.
In a more recent discussion of one impact of global climate change,
the author concluded that "satisfactory understanding of... variability
of Arctic climate remains elusive,"' 8 and that current models fit the data
poorly and "tend to produce a tremendous spread in their predicted
future warming in the Arctic."' 9
As Judge Posner has observed, there is a scientific consensus that
global warming is a serious problem, and dissent from that consensus
may actually indicate the existence of a more serious risk rather than the
13. Id. at 13-16, 20-23.
14. Id. at xvi.
15. Nigel C. A. Pitman and Peter Jorgensen, Estimating the Size of the World's Threatened
Flora,298 Scl. 989, 989 (2002).
16. Myles Allen et al., Uncertainty in the IPCCs Third Assessment Report, 293 SCl. 430, 430
(2001).
17. Id.
18. Richard E. Moritz et al., Dynamics of Recent Climate Change in the Arctic, 297 SC1.
1497, 1497 (2002).
19. Id.at 1501.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1123

contrary. 20 The fact that some scientists believe that the future harm of
global warming is lower than the consensus forecast probably also
means that some are equally convinced it is higher. Hence, there is a
band of uncertainty around the "consensus" estimate. Risk averse
individuals (a category that includes most 21people) would find this
uncertainty itself to be a cost, as Posner notes.
Despite whatever uncertainty may exist about the predictions, we
are now beginning to see litigation relating to various aspects of global
warming. Not surprisingly, standing has emerged as a major issue in
these cases.22 Recently, in Massachusetts v. EPA,23 the plaintiffs
challenged the denial of a petition asking the EPA to regulate carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles.
The D.C. Circuit panel fragmented. Judge Randolph found that the
standing and merits were completely intertwined. He ruled for the EPA
on the basis of uncertainty about the relationship between greenhouse
gases and climate, uncertainty which is "compounded by the possibility
for error inherent in the assumptions necessary to predict future climate
change. 24 Judge Sentelle would have dismissed purely on the issue of
standing on the theory that global warming might be "harmful to
humanity at large," but that the plaintiffs had shown no particularized
injury.25 In contrast, Judge Tatel found standing because projected
increases in sea level would impinge on the sovereign territory of
Massachusetts, the lead plaintiff. As to causation, Judge Tatel relied on
the affidavit of a former senior government scientist predicting sea level
changes caused by human emissions.2 6
Arguably, current climate models are firm enough to justify Judge
Tatel's conclusion about causation. But the EPA's position was to the
contrary, which left Judge Sentelle in a quandry: he believed that he
could not establish standing without in effect reversing the EPA's
position that causation was uncertain, and yet he could not review the
validity of the EPA's position without first finding standing. One escape
from this dilemma is to observe that, as in Duke Power, the independent
20.

RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 55-58 (2004).

21. Id.
22. For discussion of the issues and the case law, see Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global
Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1 (2005); David R. Hodas, Standing and
Climate Change: Can Anyone Complain About the Weather?, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 451
(2000).
23. 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
24. Id. at 57.

25. Id. at 60.
26. Id.
at 61-82.
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action of market actors has provided objective evidence of the economic
seriousness of uncertainty.
Since insurance companies specialize in assessing risks, it is not
surprising that the evidence once again comes from the insurance
industry-specifically, from the segment of the insurance industry that
provides reinsurance (essentially, protection for other insurance
companies against excess risk). Because of the risk of global warming,
reinsurance companies have increased their rates for covering
catastrophic weather events such as major hurricanes in Florida, and
some industry leaders are demanding government action to address
global warming. 27 By 1995, major European and Japanese insurance
companies had taken a formal position by issuing a Statement of
Environmental Commitment, 28 and insurance companies also played a
role at the Kyoto talks.2 9 Some insurance companies have begun to
pressure major firms whose stock they hold. 3 Indeed, the president of
the Reinsurance Association of America has reportedly warned that
global warming could bankrupt the insurance industry. 3' Thus, despite
uncertainties, the risk of global warming is large enough to have real
economic consequences, certainly in the view of the insurance industry.
It is a mistake to think that standing in cases like this depends on
proof by the plaintiffs that harmful effects will in fact occur or at least be
more likely than not. Sophisticated economic actors do not limit
themselves to certainties or to high probability events. Instead, they
recognize in the most tangible way possible-through concrete financial
decisions-that uncertain and low-probability events can be just as
important in rational decision making. If we are looking for a test to
distinguish speculative risks from those that are real and pressing enough
to form a basis of standing, economic responses to the risk may provide
just the litmus paper we need.

27.

JEREMY LEGGETT, THE CARBON WAR: GLOBAL WARMING AND THE END OF THE OIL ERA

104, 122-23 (2001).
28. Id. at 223-24.
29. Id.at 294.
30. Id. at 304.
31. Leslie H. Howe, New Solutions to Environmental Problems in Real Estate Deals 2004
(PLI Real Estate L. & Prac., Course Handbook Series, PLI Order No. 3152), Nov. 2004, at 411,
451.
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